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In 2006, Hong Kong’s Court of Appeal had to decide whether it was lawful for 
an employer to deliberately adopt a strategy to avoid having to make a statu-
tory payment to an employee. The employer’s liability to make that payment 
was contingent on the employee completing a prescribed period of continuous 
service. The employer engaged the employee under successive, non-continuous 
contracts of employment, each for a shorter duration than the prescribed period 
to prevent his liability for the payment from crystallising. The Court of Appeal 
held that there was nothing unlawful in an employer arranging his affairs so 
as to prevent his liability for the payment from even arising. This article anal-
yses the case concerned and expounds how the foregoing decision could see 
employers avoiding a whole range of employee rights and benefi ts under the 
Employment Ordinance. The article views such conduct as negating the leg-
islative intention and as being contrary to the norms of justice. To rectify the 
situation as it currently stands, we propose an amendment to the Employment 
Ordinance to prohibit such avoidance.
Introduction
“… While it may be true that morality cannot be legislated, behavior can 
be regulated. It may be true that the law cannot change the heart but it 
can restrain the heartless.” (King, 1963).1 This quotation aptly points out 
that laws are needed to protect individual or classes of individuals from 
those who seem to lack a conscience. This is particularly true of workers 
in societies who do not seem to protect or adequately protect employees 
from being exploited by their emp loyers. This article highlights Hong 
Kong legislation enacted to confer employment rights, benefi ts and pro-
tections upon employees only to have the legislative intentions thwarted 
by “heartless” employers taking advantage of loopholes emanating from 
* The authors are respectively Senior Lecturer at the School of Business, Monash University, 
Sunway Campus, Malaysia; Lecturer, and Assistant Professors at the School of Accounting and 
Finance, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University.
1 Martin Luther King Jnr., “Social Justice”, Western Michigan University, 1963, speech transcrip-
tion available at http://www.wmich.edu/library/archives/mlk/transcription.html (visited 4 July 
2012).
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less than adequately drafted statutory provisions. We conclude with a 
proposed amendment to the relevant legislation to ensure that employ-
ees do actually enjoy the employment rights, benefi ts and protections 
that the legislature had previously clearly identifi ed as being necessary. 
Employment law in Hong Kong is the English common law relating 
to employment except to the extent it has been modifi ed by statute.2 
The English common law confers rights and imposes duties upon both 
employers and employees. In Hong Kong, most of the common law rights 
and duties of the parties to a contract of employment are codifi ed in 
the Employment Ordinance (Cap 57) (EO) which came into force on 
27 September 1968 (after being passed two days earlier). In addition, the 
EO also confers other rights, benefi ts and protections upon employees. 
The rights, benefi ts and protections accorded to employees by the EO are 
the bare minimum that an employer must provide. Section 70 of the EO 
expressly provides that any term in a contract of employment purporting 
to exclude or diminish any right, benefi t or protection conferred upon 
the employee by the EO shall be void. Where the EO makes a right, ben-
efi t or protection contingent upon an employee serving a specifi ed mini-
mum period of service under a continuous contract, it would be possible 
for an employer to avoid incurring liability for a right or benefi t either by 
avoiding or by evading the same. And, as we shall see, employers have 
resorted to a whole host of arrangements to evade or avoid granting such 
statutory rights or benefi ts to employees who have put in the requisite 
period of service. 
The primary focus of this article is a case in which, to avoid making 
a statutory payment, an employer in Hong Kong adopted a stratagem 
to prevent his liability to make the payment from arising. The case was 
Lui Lin Kam v Nice Creation Development Ltd (hereafter abbreviated to 
Lui’s Case) which began life as a claim in the Labour Tribunal,3 and was 
moved, on appeal by the defendant, to the Court of First Instance of the 
2 The list of relevant statutes includes the Labour Tribunal Ordinance (Cap 25); Companies 
Ordinance (Cap 32); Apprenticeship Ordinance (Cap 47); Labour Relations Ordinance 
(Cap  55); Employment Ordinance (Cap 57); Factories and Industrial Undertakings 
Ordinance (Cap 59); Contracts for Employment Outside Hong Kong Ordinance (Cap 78); 
Inland Revenue Ordinance (Cap 112); Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115); General Holidays 
Ordinance (Cap  149); Employees’ Compensation Ordinance (Cap 282); Trade Unions 
Ordinance (Cap 332); Protection of Wages on Insolvency Ordinance (Cap 380); Occupational 
Retirement Schemes Ordinance (Cap 426); Minor Employment Claims Adjudication Board 
Ordinance (Cap 453); Sex Discrimination Ordinance (Cap 480); Mandatory Provident Fund 
Schemes Ordinance (Cap 485); Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Cap 486); Disability 
Discrimination Ordinance (Cap 487); Occupational Health and Safety Ordinance (Cap 509); 
Family Status Discrimination Ordinance (Cap 527); Race Discrimination Ordinance 
(Cap 602); and Minimum Wage Ordinance (Cap 608).
3 Lui Lin Kam v Nice Creation Development Ltd (Labour Tribunal Claim No 3887 of 2001).
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High Court4 and, on further appeal by the defendant, fi nally decided by 
Hong Kong’s Court of Appeal.5 The article begins with a brief account of 
the statutory payment in question and the legal provisions governing it. 
It then sets out the facts of the case and analyses the decision of the Court 
of Appeal and the statutory provision upon which the Court rested it. 
The possible impact of the decision on other service-based rights/benefi ts 
is then analysed. Finally, the article proposes an amendment to the EO to 
nullify the effects of the decision. 
Redundancy and Severance Payment 
The statutory payment that the employer in Lui’s Case (CFI) sought 
to avoid is what is variously referred to as “redundancy pay”6 or 
“redundancy payment”7 or “severance pay on redundancy”8 or “sever-
ance payment”.9 Redundancy and the fear of redundancy have long 
been recognised as a source of anxiety for employees in Hong Kong.10 
The word “redundant” applies to superfl uity or excess or to some-
thing unnecessary. Thus, where an employer has more workers than 
he needs, he may be said to have “redundant” employees. When the 
contract of employment is terminated by the employer because the 
services of the employee are no longer required, the employee is said to 
be made redundant. An employee is made redundant when his position 
disappears or when the employer requires fewer workers to carry out 
his operations. This may be the result of the employer closing down, 
closing a particular division, having less business or even, moving its 
operations to a different location. An employee who is made redun-
dant is, subject to his fulfi lling prescribed conditions, entitled to redun-
dancy pay (statutory or otherwise). In Hong Kong, redundancy and 
4 Lui Lin Kam v Nice Creation Development Ltd (unrep., HCLA 106/2002, [2003] HKEC 855) 
(hereinafter, “Lui’s Case (CFI)”). 
5 Lui Lin Kam v Nice Creation Development Ltd [2006] 3 HKLRD 655 (hereinafter, “Lui’s Case 
(CA)”. 
6 The term is used in Australia’s Fair Work Regulations, Available at http://www.fairwork.gov.au/
termination/redundancy/pages/how-much-redundancy-pay.aspx (visited 1 July 2012).
7 The term appears in the Irish government’s “Citizen Information”, Available at http://
www.citizensinformation.ie/en/employment/unemployment_and_redundancy/redundancy/
redundancy_payments.html (visited 1 July 2012).
8 The expression was used by the Acting Secretary for Social Services in moving the second 
reading of the Employment (Amendment) (No 2) Bill 1974: Hong Kong Hansard, 3 July 1974, 
p 986.
9 Part VA, the EO.
10 See, for example, Hong Kong Hansard, 14 February 1968, p 34. 
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redundancy pay or a severance payment on redundancy are provided 
for in Pt VA of the EO.
In Hong Kong, where an employee who has been employed under 
a continuous contract for not less than 24 months is dismissed by his 
employer, inter alia, by reason of redundancy, the employer shall pay him 
a severance payment.11 Redundancy for purposes of severance payment 
exists if an employee’s dismissal is attributable wholly or mainly to the 
fact that the business has closed or is about to close or where the type 
of work the employee was employed to do has ceased or diminished or is 
expected to cease or diminish.12 Redundancy can also be caused by the 
employer re-locating his business.13 
The institution of the severance payment did not always exist in 
Hong Kong and was introduced in the territory only in 1974 by way of 
an amendment to the EO.14 It was introduced in order to comply with 
International Recommendation No 11915 concerning the termination 
of employment at the initiative of the employer. That International 
Recommendation was formulated only in 1963 and in enacting the leg-
islative provision for severance payment in 1974, Hong Kong was not far 
behind the rest of the world.16 The situation that existed in Hong Kong 
at the time the Bill relating to severance payments was introduced in the 
legislature may be gleaned from the following:17
“… an employee may have been working for his or her employer for 5, 10 or 
even 20 years and suddenly his or her employment could be terminated by 
the employer for no fault of the employee’s own but for reason of redundancy. 
The existing labour legislation gives the employee no more protection or 
11 EO, s 31B(1). Section 31B reads:
“31B. General provisions as to right to severance payment
(1)  Where an employee who has been employed under a continuous contract for a period 
of not less than 24 months ending with the relevant date –
 (a) is dismissed by his employer by reason of redundancy; or
 (b) is laid off within the meaning of section 31E,
the employer shall … be liable to pay the employee a severance payment calculated in 
accordance with section 31G.”
12 EO, s 31B(2)(a)(i) and (b). 
13 EO, s 31B(2)(a)(ii).
14 By the Employment (Amendment) (No 2) Bill 1974.
15 International Labour Organisation (ILO) Recommendation concerning Termination of 
Employment at the Initiative of the Employer (Adoption: Geneva, 47th ILC session, 26 June 
1963), Available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:24166552
4978876::NO:12100:P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312457:NO (visited 10 July 2012).
16 The remarks were made by the Acting Secretary for Social Services in moving the second read-
ing of the Employment (Amendment) (No 2) Bill 1974. Cited from Hong Kong Hansard, 3 July 
1974, p 987.
17 Dr Chung speaking on the resumption of debate on the second reading of the Employment 
(Amendment) (No 2) Bill 1974: Hong Kong Hansard, 31 July 1974, pp 1095–1096.
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compensation than a period of notice, ranging generally from seven days 
to one month, from the employer prior to termination. At present, any 
compensation for such loss of employment due to redundancy is left to both 
the employer and the employee concerned to make their own bargains.”
Before the enactment of Pt VA of the EO, there was no statutory require-
ment for the employer to pay compensation to a worker made redun-
dant. The absence of any contractual provision regarding redundancy 
pay did not prevent employees from claiming the same. This occurred 
because there were employers who had their own schemes of payment to 
employees upon redundancy. Where an employer did have a scheme of 
redundancy payment, there were disputes on the quantum payable and 
the time of payment thereof to employees made redundant. 
The nature or rationale for severance payment on redundancy 
was authoritatively stated in the Hong Kong legislature by the then 
Acting Secretary for Social Services. Moving the second reading of the 
Employment (Amendment) (No 2) Bill 1974 to provide for severance pay 
on redundancy, this offi cial said:18 
“Severance pay on redundancy is the means whereby an employee may be 
compensated for loss of employment through no fault of his own. It is simply 
compensation for loss and not a reward for long service or good behaviour 
such as a gratuity or bonus. It arises only from dismissal due to redundancy 
and not where there is any element of volition or fault on the part of the 
employee. Where employment is terminated at the initiative of the employee 
or where the employee is dismissed for misconduct the loss may be regarded 
as self-induced and not deserving of compensation … The bill has three main 
aims. It will serve to protect employees against possible hardship arising from 
redundancy and, with Hong Kong’s present system of social security, it seems 
important that this form of protection should be available to all employees 
who come within the scope of the Employment Ordinance. Second, it should 
serve to reduce the incidence of labour disputes concerning redundancy by 
introducing a minimum legal obligation in all cases. Third, it should help 
to clear up much of the existing confusion by confi rming the practice, and 
regulating the method, of making severance payments.”
The introduction of severance payment was clearly motivated by the 
desire to do right by an employee who lost his job through no fault of his 
own. In seeking to cushion the employee against the hardship consequent 
18 Hong Kong Hansard, 3 July 1974, p 987. 
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upon involuntary unemployment, the provision in question may be said 
to be moved by an ethical concern. An employer seeking to evade or 
avoid the liability imposed by the provision may be said to be acting 
unethically even though the measures he adopts are in themselves legal.
Service under a Continuous Contract
In Hong Kong, as elsewhere, employers have been exercised by the statu-
tory grant of rights, benefi ts and protections on employees because com-
pliance with the legislation affects their bottom lines. Perhaps to increase 
the acceptability of such requirements, the legislation usually links the 
rights, benefi ts and protections it confers upon employees to continu-
ous employment, ie to working under a continuous contract of employ-
ment for a minimum prescribed duration.19 Generally, the employee must 
have served the same employer for the requisite period of continuous 
employment to enjoy a statutory right or benefi t or protection. Different 
qualifying periods of continuous employment may be fi xed for different 
rights, benefi ts or protections. For example, to be entitled to the mini-
mum statutory period of notice, an employee must have worked under 
a continuous contract for a minimum of four weeks and for 18 hours or 
more in each of those weeks.20 The qualifying period of service under a 
continuous contract for other benefi ts conferred by the EO is: 
1 1 month for sickness allowance [s 33]; 
2 3 months for holiday pay [s 40]; 
3 12 months for annual paid leave [ s 41AA(1)];
4 40 weeks for maternity leave pay before the date of expected 
confi nement [s 14(2)(a)]; 
5 60 months for long service payment [s 31R(1)]. 
An employee who has been employed under a continuous contract 
is entitled to not less than one rest day in every period of seven days 
[s 17(1)].
In Hong Kong, a “continuous contract” is a statutory construct. The 
EO defi nes a “continuous contract” to mean “a contract of employment 
19 As indicated by the argument whether severance pay, when introduced, should be backdated 
two or fi ve or seven years of earlier service: Hong Kong Hansard, 31 July 1984, p 1096. Dr Chung 
speaking on the resumption of debate on the second reading of the Employment (Amendment) 
(No 2) Bill 1974 reported on the argument as to whether the qualifying period for severance 
pay should be 6, 20 or 36 months: Hong Kong Hansard, 31 July 1974, p 1098.
20 EO, s 6 read together with s 5.
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under which an employee is deemed by virtue of the provisions of Sch 1 
(to the EO) to be in continuous employment”.21 Section 3(2) then pro-
ceeds to place on the employer the onus of proving that a contract of 
employment is not a “continuous contract”.
Paragraph 1 of Sch 1 simply declares, “the provisions of this Schedule are 
to ascertain whether or not any contract of employment is a ‘continuous 
contract’ for the purposes of the EO”. The rest of Sch 1 could have been 
better drafted but para 2 and para 3(1) thereof read:
“2.  Subject to the following provisions, where at any time an employee has 
been employed under a contract of employment during the period of 
4 or more weeks next preceding such time he shall be deemed to have 
been in continuous employment during that period. 
3.  (1) For the purposes of paragraph 2, no week shall count unless the 
employee has worked for 18 hours or more in that week, and in determining 
whether he has worked in any hour the provisions of sub-paragraph (2) 
shall apply.” 
What the foregoing provisions mean is that to be deemed to be in “con-
tinuous employment” a person must have worked for the same employer 
for a period of not less than four weeks and during each of the four weeks, 
he must have worked for at least 18 hours. It follows then that if a period 
of continuous employment of, say, 23 months and three weeks is followed 
by a week in which the employee does not work at all for other than a 
lawful reason (eg medical or annual leave), his continuity of employment 
is broken. Such a break in the continuity of employment of an employee 
will disqualify him from receiving any benefi t or protection for which 
24 months continuous service is a condition precedent.
One of the earliest judicial interpretations of the concept of a con-
tinuous contract of employment as defi ned in the EO arose out of a claim 
for a long service payment. A long service payment is predicated on a 
minimum of 60 months’ service under a continuous contract. The provi-
sions concerning long service payments were incorporated into the EO 
by the insertion therein of Pt VB entitled, “Long Service Payments”. The 
quantum of any long service payment is calculated based on the duration 
of service under a “continuous contract”; the longer the service under a 
21 EO, s 3(1).
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continuous contract, the higher the long service payment.22 Part VB of 
the EO came into effect on 2 January 1986.
Not all employers were thrilled by the prospect of having to fork 
out long service payments if and when these became due and payable. 
One such employer was the appellant in David Hot Blocking Press Ltd 
v Ho King Yam.23 The case represents an employer setting into motion 
an attempt to circumvent the long service payment even before the 
provisions concerning long service payments came into operation. 
Seeking to avoid its liability for long service payments when the long 
service provisions came into force (on 2 January 1986), the appel-
lant employer terminated a number of its employees (including the 
respondent on whom we focus hereafter). The respondent’s contract 
of employment was terminated on 30 December 1985 and the appel-
lant employer paid the respondent all the monies due to him under 
the EO on the same day. At the risk of stating the obvious, be it noted 
that these did not include any long service payment. The appellant 
then reemployed the respondent under a written contract. The con-
tract was signed on 31 December 1985 and was expressed to take 
effect on 2 January 1986. 
Part VB of the EO provided that an employee eligible for a long service 
payment who had served under a continuous contract for a maximum of 
nine years before 1 January 1986 was entitled to that benefi t as calcu-
lated from 1 January 1977. The employee (Ho King Yam) in David Hot 
Blocking Press Ltd v Ho King Yam seems to have been in the continuous 
service of the employer from earlier than 1977. The employer thought 
that the break in the continuity of employment (from 30 December 
1985 to 2 January 1986) that it had created would prevent a “continu-
ous contract of employment” from being computed from the fi rst day the 
employee respondent was employed by the appellant employer before 
1977. The employee disagreed and instituted proceedings in the Labour 
Tribunal which allowed his claim. The employer appealed to the then 
High Court of the Supreme Court of Hong Kong.
At the High Court, the appeal was heard by the Honourable D Yam J 
(as his Lordship then was). The learned appeal judge had no diffi culty 
discerning the stark choice presented to him by the facts of the case 
and the law. Here was an employer who had set into motion, even 
before Pt VB of the EO came into operation, an arrangement that, if 
22 See s 31V (read together with Sch 7) of the EO for the formula for calculating the long service 
payments.
23 [1996] 1 HKC 270.
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upheld, would defeat the benefi t of a long service payment the Part 
meant to confer upon employees in the position of the respondent. 
And, whether the appellant employer succeeded or fell depended on 
the interpretation of the notion of a “continuous contract” as defi ned 
in the EO.
The Hon D Yam J faced an insurmountable problem in the language 
of para 2 and para 3(1) of Sch 1 to the EO. The language clearly means 
that to be deemed to be in “continuous employment” a person must 
have worked for the same employer for a period of not less than four 
weeks and during each of the four weeks, he must have worked for at 
least 18 hours. It follows then that if a period of continuous employment 
of, say, 23 months and three weeks is followed by a week in which the 
employee does not work at all for other than a lawful reason (eg medical 
or annual leave), his continuity of employment is broken. Such a break 
in the continuity of employment of an employee will disqualify him from 
receiving any benefi t or protection for which 24 months’ continuous ser-
vice is a condition precedent. To overcome this problem, the Hon D 
Yam J began by holding:
“... that the concept of ‘continuous employment’ is not a concept which can 
be deduced from the wording itself. In other words, the exercise of fi nding 
the meaning of ‘continuous employment’ is not an exercise to fi nd out the 
plain and obvious meaning of the word ‘continuous’. It is a statutory concept 
and the meaning thereof could only be found in the statute rather than con-
struction of the words. Put it in another way, the use of the word ‘continuous’ 
is generic as well as descriptive. This is in line with a number of decisions 
which I shall come to in a moment.” (para 8)
Whether one fi nds the foregoing valid as a principle of statutory con-
struction is not relevant but it did permit the learned appeal judge to 
traverse a plethora of authorities to draw a conclusion as to the import 
of para 2 and para 3(1) of Sch 1 to the EO. His Lordship held that for a 
contract of employment not to be a “continuous contract”:
“… an employe r must dismiss an employee for four or more weeks (before a 
material date) or during those four weeks preceding (the material date), the 
employee was not asked to work for 18 or more hours.” (para 14)
As the appellant employer had dismissed the employee for less than 
four weeks before re-employing him and in the four weeks preceding 
the dismissal had employed him for more than 18 hours or more in 
each of those weeks, the employee had worked under a continuous 
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contract. In other words, the break in the continuity of employment 
from 30 December 1985 to 2 January 1986 could be ignored and the 
employee was entitled to a long service payment computed with effect 
from 1 January 1977. This decision, as we shall see, would loom large 
in Lui’s case.
Lui Lin Kam v Nice Creation Development Ltd 
(Lui’s Case)
The facts in Lui’s Case, in so far as they are material to redundancy, are 
simple and straightforward. The defendant operated a seafood restaurant 
and employed the three claimants. By a notice dated 14 February 2001, 
the defendant terminated the employment of all three claimants. The 
reason for the termination was that the restaurant needed redecoration 
and its scale of operation would be reduced thereafter.24 Clearly, this was 
a case of an employer making employees redundant. On 28 May 2001, 
the claimants sued the defendant in the Labour Tribunal. The claimants 
sought various reliefs. On 22 October 2002, the Adjudicating Offi cer25 at 
the Labour Tribunal awarded all the three claimants severance payments 
as well as compensation for rest days. The defendant appealed to the 
Court of First Instance against the award of severance payments only and 
even then, it did not appeal against the same award to the fi rst claimant. 
In other words, the appeal was limited to the award of severance payment 
to the second and third claimants.
The substantive employment history of the second and third claimants 
with the defendant may be shortly stated. The second claimant worked 
for the defendant for the period from 23 October 1996 to 15 March 2001 
(a period of four years and fi ve months) under three written contracts, 
all on their face, for 18 months each. The third claimant worked for the 
defendant from 1 September 1995 and her last day of work was 15 March 
2001 (a period of fi ve years and seven months). The fi rst contract of both 
respondents did run for 18 months. However, the duration of the second 
18-month contract of the second and third claimants was extended by 
agreement, by a month, to 19 months until the end of September 1999. 
Both the second and third claimants signed, on 15 October 1999, another 
24 The factual information in this paragraph is reproduced from Lui’s Case (CFI) (n 4 above), 
para 1.
25 Rather than being designated a “magistrate” or a “judge”, the offi cer presiding over proceedings 
at the Labour Tribunal is a judicial offi cer termed an “Adjudicating Offi cer”.
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18-month contract and each of the third contracts was prematurely ter-
minated by the defendant on 15 March 2001 (ie after some 17 months).26
There was a dispute of fact as to whether the second and third 
claimants actually worked for the defendant for the period between 
the second and third written contracts (“the disputed period”).27 The 
two claimants said they did work during this period and were paid in 
cash. The defendant disputed this. The dispute on this point is impor-
tant because if the two claimants in fact worked during the disputed 
period, they would have been in the service of the defendant under a 
continuous contract for not less than 24 months. And, by virtue of the 
service under a continuous contract for not less than 24 months, each 
would be entitled to a severance payment. At the Labour Tribunal, 
the Presiding Offi cer did not make any fi nding of fact on the disputed 
period.28 The Adjudicating Offi cer did not do so because he seems to 
have considered himself to be bound by the decision of Yam J which 
has been discussed earlier in this article. This was the decision in David 
Hot Blocking Press Ltd v Ho King Yam on the import of the provisions of, 
inter alia, paras 2 and 3 of Sch 1 to the EO.29 Yam J in David Hot Blocking 
Press Ltd v Ho King Yam held that the statutory provisions meant that 
an employee who had had his services terminated and then been re-
employed was to be treated as if he had been continuously employed if 
the period between his fi rst and second stints of employment were to 
be less than four weeks and if he was asked to work for 18 hours or more 
within the preceding four weeks.30 The adoption of Yam J’s decision by 
the Adjudicating Offi cer deemed the claimants to have been employed 
under a continuous contract under the contract preceding the disputed 
period, the disputed period itself and the contract that succeeded the 
disputed period. This entitled the claimants to a severance payment 
which the Adjudicating Offi cer had awarded. The defendant employer 
appealed to the Court of First Instance.
In the Court of First Instance, Lam DJ (as he then was)31 heard the 
defendant’s appeal and handed down his judgment on 9 July 2003. In so 
far as the Adjudicating Offi cer had relied on the decision in David Hot 
Blocking Press Ltd v Ho King Yam to rule that the claimants had been in 
26 The factual data in this paragraph is reproduced from Lui’s Case (CFI) (n 4 above), para 4. 
27 The expression is that used by Deputy High Court Judge Lam in Lui’s Case (CFI) (n 4 above), 
para 3. 
28 Details of the “disputed period” and the fact that the Presiding Offi cer did not make any fi nding 
of fact on the dispute are derived from Lui’s Case (CFI) (n 4 above), para 3. 
29 See n 23 above.
30 See n 23 above at 276C; in the original judgment the remark is at para 14.
31 The learned judge is hereinafter identifi ed as “Lam DJ”.
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“continuous employment” by the defendant, Lam DJ had no diffi culty in 
holding that to be wrong in law. However, that was not the end of the mat-
ter for Lam DJ. His Lordship went on to note that “in addition to mutual 
agreement (or arrangement) and trade custom, paragraph 3(2)(b) (of the 
Sch 1) also referred to absence from work in circumstances such that by 
law an employee is regarded as continuing in employment”.32 His Lord-
ship then went on to invoke and explain the common law concept of a 
“global contract” by citing, inter alia, the following passage from McLeod v 
Hellyer Brothers [1987] IRLR 232 at pp 238–239 as follows:33 
“The concept of a global contract of employment … may become relevant 
in cases where the evidence discloses what on the face of them was a series of 
contracts for service or services entered between the same parties and cover-
ing a substantial period of time. On the particular facts of such a case it may 
be open to the Industrial Tribunal properly to infer from the parties’ conduct 
(notwithstanding the absence of any evidence as to any express agreement 
of this nature) the existence of a continuing overriding arrangement which 
governed the whole of their relationship and itself amounted to a contract 
of employment. Such a contract is frequently referred to as a ‘global’ or 
‘umbrella’ contract.” (Per Slade LJ) 
Lam DJ applied the concept to the case before him as follows:34
“On the material before me, I am prepared to draw an inference from the 
indisputable facts in the present case that there was an agreement or tacit 
understanding between the Claimants and the Defendant in September 
1999 that they would be re-engaged after the expiry of the contracts of 
1 February 1998 as they eventually did on 15 October 1999. The evidence 
showed that the Defendant had adopted this practice of signing successive 
contracts with its employees and having read the transcript of the evidence 
given in the Labour Tribunal, I found nothing from the testimonies (sic) 
of the defence witnesses to indicate that the Defendant did not intend to 
32 Lui’s case (CFI) (n 4 above), para 19. The relevant portion of para 3(2)(b) of Sch 1 reads:
“3(2) If in any hour the employee is, for the whole or part of the hour-
 (a) incapable of work in consequence of sickness or injury; … ; or,
 (b) absent from work in circumstances such that, by law, mutual arrangement or the 
custom of the trade, business or undertaking, he is regarded as continuing in the 
employment of his employer for any purpose,
 then, … that hour shall count as an hour in which he has worked.”
33 Quoted from Lam DJ in Wong Man Kwan v Chun Shing Holdings Ltd [2003] 3 HKLRD 403, 
para 13. 
34 See n 4 above, para 21.
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continue with the employment of the Claimants in September 1999. To the 
contrary, their evidence clearly showed that there was a tacit understand-
ing of re-engagement of the Claimants in October 1999 ... Hence, even if 
the Claimants did not work during the Disputed Period, the case may come 
within Paragraph 3(2)(b).”
Thus, Lam DJ disagreed with the reasoning of the Adjudication Offi cer 
but not his ultimate conclusion; only, Lam DJ reached that by a differ-
ent route. The learned judge held that the three contracts by themselves 
amounted to a global contract and that, consequently, there was a con-
tinuous contract unaffected by the two-week break in the employment 
of the claimants between the second and third contracts. The employer 
appealed to the Court of Appeal.
The reception of the exposition of the concept of a “continuous 
contract” in the EO by the Hong Kong courts merits examination. In 
fact, Yam J himself recorded this in another case his Lordship decided, 
Wong Man Sum v Wonderland Seafood Restaurant (“Wong Man Sum”).35 
In this case, the employer resorted to the device of successive 18-month 
contracts separated by a break of 16 days during which the employee 
did not work for the employer company at all. Discoursing on the statu-
tory defi nition of a “continuous contract” in Sch 1 to the EO, Yam J 
reversed himself on the stand he had taken in David Hot on the statutory 
defi nition of a “continuous contract”. In Wong Man Sum, the learned 
judge recorded:36
“13.  …. In David Hot Blocking Press Ltd v. Ho King Yam [1996] 1 HKC 270, 
at 276C, I had said, by way of obiter, that:
‘In other words, in order to defeat the purposes of this part of the 
Ordinance, an employer must dismiss an employee for four or more 
weeks or during those four weeks preceding, the employee was not asked 
to work for 18 or more hours ... ’
14.  I am afraid this part of my judgment is quite misleading. From the whole 
of my judgment and the provisions in the First Schedule, it actually meant 
that ‘... the employee was not asked to work for 18 or more hours’ in any 
one of those four weeks. Otherwise, it would not stand to reason that 
during the four preceding weeks the employee would only be required to 
35 Wong Man Sum v Wonderland Seafood Restaurant (unrep., HCLA 133/2002 [2005] HKEC 885).
36 See n 35 above, paras 13–16.
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work for 18 or more hours in order to have a continuous contract even 
there was a break of four solid weeks.
15. Subsequent decisions were made to the same effect:
(1)  Leung Wan Kee Shipyard v. Lik Shau Foo [1995] 3 HKC 229 per 
Waung J.
(2)  In Wong Man Kwan v. Chun Shing Holdings Ltd (unreported), 
HCLA29/2002, at para 27, Deputy High Court Judge Lam (as he 
then was) decided that:
‘The combined effect of paragraphs 2 and 3 [of the First Schedule] is 
that so long as an employee has worked for 4 weeks preceding the rel-
evant date and worked at least 18 hours for each week, he would be 
deemed to be in a continuous employment, or in other words, deemed 
to be employed under a continuous contract.’
(3)  In Lui Lin Kam and others v. Nice Creation Development Ltd (unre-
ported), HCLA106/2002, 9 July 2003, Deputy Judge Lam decided 
to the same effect.
16.  Thus it is quite settled law that in deciding whether a person is in con-
tinuous employment, a period of not less than four weeks before the 
relevant date, the employee must have worked for 18 hours at least in 
each of those weeks, unless the case falls within the exceptions provided 
under paragraph 3(2).”
The four paragraphs quoted above37 place the import of the statutory pro-
visions beyond doubt. It is clear that where there is a four-week break in 
employment (the break), the continuity of employment ends. Also, if an 
employee works for less than 18 hours in any one week, that too breaks the 
continuity of employment. In both situations, if the employee is thereafter 
reemployed, he cannot claim to be employed under a continuous contract 
with reference to his earlier employment.38 And so, back to Lui’s Case.
37 In Lui’s Case (CA) (n 5 above) at para 10, Tang JA characterised the four paragraphs quoted 
as Yam J explaining “that his dictum ha(d) been misunderstood and what he meant was that a 
break of one week was suffi cient”.
38 It should come as no surprise that Yam J did not accept this as a ground of appeal in n 35 above. 
However, Yam J allowed the appeal on the basis that the 16-day break in employment had 
been pursuant to “some mutual arrangement” between the employer and the employee. The 
employer appealed to the Court of Appeal but we shall deal fi rst with the appeal in Lui’s Case 
(CA) (n 5 above).
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At the Court of Appeal, the leading judgment on the appeal in Lui’s 
Case was delivered by Tang JA (with whose judgment the two other 
members of the Coram agreed).39 The learned Justice of Appeal held that 
as a matter of statutory construction an employee was not in continu-
ous employment if “the employee was not asked to work for 18 hours or 
more” in any week preceding a second contract.40 The claim was remit-
ted to the Labour Tribunal to take evidence on and decide this point. 
The rest of the appeal was decided on the basis that the claimants did 
not have the continuous service of 24 months that would entitle them to 
a severance payment.
The learned Justice of Appeal also rejected the learned trial judge’s 
view that the evidence revealed an umbrella or global contract to entitle 
the claimants to severance payment. His Lordship reviewed the evidence 
to hold that he could not agree with Lam DJ that there was even evidence 
to justify “an inescapable inference” that a global contract existed.41 His 
Lordship also reviewed the authorities on the existence of a global con-
tract. The authorities established that for a global contract to arise to 
cover intermittent employment there must, inter alia, be a mutuality of 
obligation spanning the duration of the employment—there must be 
a mutual arrangement that during the break the employee should be 
regarded as continuing in employment for any purpose.42 Absent such 
mutuality, a number of sporadic bouts of employment may each amount 
to a contract of employment without collectively giving rise to a global 
contract. As Tang JA put it:43
“To constitute a global contract there must be the irreducible minimum of 
mutual obligations otherwise there will be no contractual link between the 
individual engagements with the result that there would be no global contract.”
In the case under appeal, the claimants’ second and third 18-month 
contracts were separated by breaks of two weeks when the mutuality of 
obligations was missing. There was therefore no global contract and the 
claimants did not have the continuous contract of 24 months necessary 
for severance payment. The appeal was dismissed.
39 See n 5 above, para 1 at p 657 and para 54 at p 677.
40 See n 5 above, para 11 at p 660. Be that as it may, at the time that the Adjudicating Offi cer had 
to decide on the claim in Lui, the decision in David Hot (n 23 above), was binding on him (the 
Adjudicating Offi cer). 
41 See n 5 above, para 37 at p 672.
42 See n 35 above, para 34. 
43 See n 5 above, para 27.
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Sections 31B(1) and 70 of the EO and Discrete 18-month Contracts 
Section 31B(1) of the EO confers upon an employee the benefi t or protec-
tion of severance payment if he had been employed under a continuous 
contract for a period of not less than 24 months ending with the relevant 
date. In Lui’s Case, the claimants had been employed under consecu-
tive, but not continuous, 18-month contracts. In disallowing the claim 
for severance payment, the learned Justice of Appeal clearly applied the 
literal approach in interpreting s 31B(1). Is there any approach to stat-
utory interpretation that could have led to the claimants’ succeeding? 
Perhaps the only approach that might have had the whisper of a chance 
would be the purposive approach—which seems to hold sway in the fi eld 
of statutory construction in Hong Kong. The pre-eminence of the pur-
posive approach in the Territory emerges from the following passage in 
the unanimous judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Town Planning 
Board v Society for the Protection of the Harbour Ltd:44
“In interpreting a statute, the function of the courts is to ascertain the intention of 
the legislature as expressed in the legislation. The statute must be considered as a 
whole. Any statutory provision must be understood in its context taken in its 
widest sense…. A purposive approach should be adopted. In construing a statute, 
the courts should adopt an interpretation which is consistent with and gives 
effect to the legislative purpose. An interpretation which is inconsistent with 
and does not serve that purpose should be avoided.” (Emphasis provided)
Provided that the foregoing principles are adhered to, words should 
be given their natural meaning if doing this is consistent with the 
legislature’s intention. This emerges from the following passage in the 
judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ho Choi Wan v Hong Kong 
Housing Authority:45
“In construing the language of a statute, it is the task of the court to ascertain 
and give effect to the intention of the legislature. But that does not mean 
that the Court must give a literal construction to every word or phrase in 
the statute. As Lord Bingham of Cornhill said in R (Quintavalle) v Secretary 
of State for Health [2003] 2 AC 687 at p 695: ‘The court’s task, within the 
44 (2004) 7 HKCFAR 1 at 13–14, paras 28–29, per Chief Justice Li. In Medical Council of Hong 
Kong v Chow Siu Shek David (2000) 3 HKCFAR 144 at 153, Bokhary PJ with whose judgment 
the other members of the Court of Final Appeal agreed, referred to “ … the modern tendency 
to give statutes a purposive construction”.
45 (2005) 8 HKCFAR 628, para 109, per Lord Millett NPJ with whose judgment the other mem-
bers of the Coram agreed.
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permissible bounds of interpretation, is to give effect to Parliament’s pur-
pose.’ Whenever the legislature enacts or amends an Ordinance, its purpose 
is to remedy a perceived mischief or defect in the pre-existing legislation. It is 
to be presumed that it did not intend the statute to go wider in its operation 
than is necessary to remedy the mischief or defect in question.”
It is crucial to remember the background against which the amendment 
was proposed to insert severance payment in the EO. What was con-
sidered to be the mischief were the number and frequency of disputes 
over redundancies: over the period from 1 July 1968 to 30 April 1974, 
more than 40 per cent of all major labour disputes dealt with by the 
Labour Relations Service concerned redundancy.46 Legislators were con-
cerned to protect employees against such redundancies and lay-offs. The 
original bill proposed service under a continuous contract for 24 months 
or more as the entitlement for a severance payment. A shorter period 
of six months had been suggested as had been a longer period of con-
tinuous employment of 36 months.47 Other amendments were also 
moved. Eventually, the Legislative Council settled on the continuous 
employment of at least 24 months as a condition precedent for a sev-
erance payment. Severance payment then was the remedy upon which 
the Legislature resolved to protect employees against redundancies and 
lay-offs but only if they had completed two years’ service with the same 
employer. The qualifying service of two years’ employment with the same 
employer was a part of the remedy. Resorting to the purposive approach 
would not help the claimants. 
Could the Court of Appeal have taken some other factor in the con-
textual background to strike down the devices that the employers had 
deployed to defeat the legislative intent of the section? The legislature’s 
intention to provide a cushion for employees against the involuntary 
cessation of their employment does not appear in s 31B(1) itself but is 
clearly manifested in the Hansard. Could this intention be read into s 
31B(1)? The purposive approach permits the court to avoid a result that 
is contrary to the legislative intention by excluding words in a statu-
tory provision.48 The problem in s 31B(1) arises from the words requiring 
a minimum of 24 months of employment under a continuous contract 
46 Secretary for Social Services (Acting) moving the second reading of the Employment 
(Amendment) (No 2) Bill 1974: Hong Kong Hansard, 3 July 1974, p 987. This was the bill that 
inserted provisions relating to severance payment into the EO. 
47 Dr Chung speaking on the resumption of debate on the second reading of the Employment 
(Amendment) (No 2) Bill 1974: Hong Kong Hansard, 31 July 1974, p 1098. 
48 McMonagle v Westminster City Council [1990] 1 All ER 993. This, however, is a weak authority 
for the proposition under discussion because in it, the Court was concerned with surplus words 
in a statutory provision. That clearly is not the case with s 31B(1) of the EO.
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to qualify for a severance payment. Can the section be meaningful if 
the court excludes the words creating the “qualifi cation”? The answer, 
regretfully, has to be in the negative. It may be argued that where the 
clear intention of the legislature is frustrated, the court should be able to 
enlarge or to whittle down, as necessary, the scope of the words defi ning a 
remedy in a statutory provision. Here, the remedy is a severance payment 
if the employee has served the employer continuously for 24 months. May 
the court somehow interpret the provision to apply after an 18-month 
stint of employment? Even if the court is seized of such a jurisdiction, for 
the court to do so would be to go beyond the limits that the legislature 
was prepared to go when it inserted the severance payment provisions 
in the EO. For the fact is, as highlighted above, that it was reported 
to the legislature that the Labour Advisory Board had considered and 
rejected proposals to make severance payments available after a shorter 
and longer qualifying period of six months and 36 months and rejected 
both in favour of 24 months. The legislature could have rejected the 
views of the Labour Advisory Board but it did not. The intention of the 
legislature that the period of qualifying period for a severance payment 
be 24 months cannot be questioned. 
To be entitled to a severance payment, each claimant in Lui’s Case 
should have been employed under a continuous contract for a period of 
not less than 24 months on the date their third contracts were termi-
nated. Here, the claimants had been employed under consecutive, but 
not continuous, 18-month contracts. The trial judge had, at para 22 of 
his judgment, said:49 
“It seems to me that the whole point of this arrangement of successive con-
tracts was a scheme to avoid liabilities for severance payment or long-service 
payment. DW3 admitted as much in his testimony … The defendant clearly 
intended to extinguish or reduce the claimants’ right to severance payment 
or long-service payment.”
The second sentence of the trial judge reproduced above uses the lan-
guage of s 70 of the EO which reads, “Any term of a contract of employ-
ment which purports to extinguish or reduce any right, benefi t or protec-
tion conferred upon the employee by this Ordinance shall be void”.50 
Could the claimants seek the assistance of s 70 in their claim for sever-
ance payment? Tang JA addressed this question head on. His Lordship 
seems to hold the view that where severance payment is concerned, s 70 
49 Cited from Lui’s Case (CA) (n 5 above), p 661 at para 15, per Tang JA.
50 Tang JA reproduced s 70 in para 48 of his judgment in Lui’s Case (CA) (n 5 above) at p 676.
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is only engaged when, fi rst, there is a continuous contract of 24 months 
or more and second, that contract contains a term which purports to 
extinguish or reduce the employee’s entitlement to a severance payment. 
In Lui’s Case, these requirements were not satisfi ed. Accordingly, Tang 
JA concluded that where parties enter into successive contracts with 
appropriate breaks so that they do not constitute a continuous contract, 
the contracts are not covered by s 70.51 Given the clarity of the words of 
s 70, no other interpretation is possible. 
Avoidance of Obligations Imposed on Employers by the EO 
In disposing of Lui’s Case, Tang JA made several comments that bear 
repeating. These are reproduced below:
“… An employer is entitled to arrange its affairs to take advantage of the provisions 
of Sch 1. I conceive it to be my duty to uphold his right to do so.” (p 676, 
para 47, emphasis provided.)
“It is quite obvious from the evidence that the defendant had adopted the prac-
tice of entering into employment contracts of 18 months only with its employees, 
with the view to avoid liability to pay, for example, severance pay. Insofar as the 
right to such payment depended on a continuous contract for 24 months, 
the defendant was acting perfectly within its legal right not to employ a worker for 
a continuous period of 24 months. I am concerned with the legal rights of the 
parties and not with the morality of such a practice. No doubt many employ-
ers will be guided by their self interest and they would wish to employ their 
employees on a long term basis for the sake of good morale and loyalty. But 
provided an employer was acting within the law, he is also entitled to the full 
measure of the law.” (p 673, para 38, emphasis provided)
“I do not believe that entering into successive contracts with the appropri-
ate breaks so that they do not constitute a continuous contract is covered 
by s 70 at all. As I have explained, the employer was only doing what it was 
entitled to do under the Ordinance. Nor can I ignore the two weeks’ break. 
It was adopted to break the continuity of employment. Provided there was a 
real break of two weeks and there was no global contract covering more than 
one period of 18 months, it must be given the effect which it was designed to 
have.” (p 676, para 49.)
51 See n 5 above, p 676 at para 49.
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In the fi rst of the passages quoted above, the learned Justice of Appeal 
says, “An employer is entitled to arrange its affairs to take advantage 
of the provisions of Sch 1”. The remark applies with equal force to the 
rest of the EO. That is to say, an employer is entitled to so arrange its 
affairs to avoid or prevent its liability for other service-based benefi ts 
to employees from even arising. As such measures are perfectly legal, 
in adopting them, the employer would be avoiding rather than evading 
liability under the statute.
In the second paragraph quoted above, the learned Justice of Appeal 
says, “I am concerned with the legal rights of the parties and not with the 
morality of such a practice”. The very fact that his Lordship incorporates 
“morality” into his comment is indicative of the Court being aware that 
the employer’s ethics in avoiding liability are, at the very least, ques-
tionable. But then, his Lordship does not call for an amendment to the 
EO to prevent such avoidance. The absence of such a call is striking—
particularly as may be construed as indicating that the Court of Appeal 
approves of the law as it stands.
The Impact of the Employer Avoiding Liability under the EO
Allowing employers to avoid their liabilities under the EO will be to 
grant them a licence to exploit their employees by adopting contracts 
that prevent their liabilities from arising. After all, employers tak-
ing advantage of loopholes in the law is not a new phenomenon as 
is revealed by the following extracts from speeches delivered in the 
Legislative Council:
“… in order to shun (sic) or cut (ie reduce) the statutory rights of their 
employees, some unscrupulous employers have been … changing the con-
tracts of employment to short-term contracts, deliberately making the 
employees unable to meet the qualifying service for long service payment or 
severance payment.”52 
“… a lot of unscrupulous employers take advantage of the loopholes in the 
legislation to dismiss employees or deprive them of their benefi ts by chang-
ing the contract of employment. For example, some employers force their 
employees who have a service of nearly fi ve years to resign fi rst and then 
52 The Hon Mr Chan Wing Chan, speaking on the resumption of the debate on the Second 
Reading of the Employment (Amendment) (No 2) Bill 1997: Hong Kong Hansard, 17 June 
1997, p 128.
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re-engage them, and thus prevent their employee(s) from obtaining long 
service payment provided in the legislation. Some employers may sign 
non-consecutive short-term contracts of employment of less than two years 
with their employees to render the latter unprotected under the provisions 
concerning severance.”53
The closing sentence of the second quotation above mirrors the facts in 
Lui’s Case. 
The Court of Appeal’s recognition of an employer’s right to avoid his 
statutory liabilities in Lui’s Case gives employers carte blanche to avoid 
as many of their statutory obligations to their employees as they can. 
One of the ways in which employers can avoid such liabilities is to 
treat their employees as independent contractors;54 the latter are not 
entitled in law to the benefi ts and protections conferred upon employ-
ees by the EO.55 In the past, the courts have struck down employers’ 
attempts to avoid their statutory obligations to their employees even 
where the employer has had the employee agree in writing that he was 
not an employee and was not entitled to the benefi ts and protections 
conferred by the EO on employees.56 Employers seem to have learnt 
that just requiring an employee to deny his status as an employee and 
to renounce his benefi ts under the EO might not survive scrutiny by 
53 The Hon Mr Leung Yiu-Ching, speaking on the resumption of the debate on the Second 
Reading of the Employment (Amendment) (No 2) Bill 1997: Hong Kong Hansard, 17 June 
1997, p 131. The response of the Secretary for Education and Manpower who closed the debate 
on the Bill was largely a non sequitor. He said, at p 136: 
“The Hon Leung Yiu-Ching has just raised many questions, and it is a pity that he is not in 
the Chamber right now. In fact, I do not quite understand the rationale behind many of his 
questions. If he had asked one of the questions with the intention of borrowing my car and 
I think he wants to borrow my car so that he can rush back to this Council to cast his vote, 
particularly when he votes in support of the Government, I would be most happy to lend him 
my private car.” (Hong Kong Hansward, 17 June 1997, p 136).
54 The EO is silent on independent contractors but the common law in Hong Kong has adopted 
the concept and its difference from an employee. An employer has to pay wages to an employee 
but only the agreed contract sum to an independent contractor. Other than the payment for 
work done, an independent contractor does not enjoy any of the benefi ts and protections that 
the EO confers upon employees. The common law has devised various “approaches” or “tests” 
including the control test, the organisational approach (or integration test), and the overall 
impression approach (or multifactor test) to distinguish between an employee and an indepen-
dent contractor. The current approach adopted by the courts is the overall impression approach, 
which emphasises consideration of the varying factors in the employment relationship. For the 
“approaches” or “tests”, see, for example, Rick Glofcheski and Farzana Aslam et al, Employment 
Law and Practice in Hong Kong (Sweet and Maxwell, 2010), pp 21–41, and Krishnan Arjunan 
and Abdul Majid, Business Law in Hong Kong (LexisNexis, 2009), pp 560–572. 
55 These benefi ts and protections include wages, wages in lieu of notice, paid statutory holidays, 
paid annual holidays, paid sickness leave, maternity benefi ts and, where an employee has the 
requisite “qualifying” continuous service, severance payment and even a long service payment.
56 Lam Yau Kuen v Easy (Hang Fung) Transportation Co Ltd (unrep., DCCJ 1/2006, [2006] 
HKEC 2218). 
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the court. To prove that there was no intention to create an employer-
employee relationship and that such a relationship did not in fact come 
into existence, employers refuse to enter into a contract of employment 
with an individual; instead, they require the individual to register a busi-
ness or company to which they contract the job that would otherwise 
have been performed by the individual. One such case is Lam Yau Kuen 
v Easy (Hang Fung) Transportation Co Ltd.57 This case illustrates the 
extent to which employers will go to avoid their statutory obligations 
to an employee. 
The plaintiff-employee responded to an advertisement for lorry driv-
ers. He was met by and had discussions with Mr Lee, a representative 
of Easy (Hang Fung) Transportation Company Limited, the fi rst defen-
dant (D1) and Ying Wui Transportation Limited, the second defendant 
(D2) (hereafter, collectively referred to as “the two employers”). In an 
elaborate charade to avoid their liabilities as employers under the EO, 
Lee asked the claimant to register a business name with the Business 
Registration Offi ce and told him that an agreement would be signed 
between the two defendants using the name of D1 and the plaintiff using 
his business name of Kwan Kee Transportation Company (Kwan Kee). 
What the case report does not expressly state but can be inferred is that 
D1 and D2 would not enter into a contract of employment with the 
plaintiff and would use his services only if he registered a business. The 
rationale for this was brilliant—a business organisation cannot be an 
employee as it cannot demand overtime, or statutory holidays, or annual 
leave, or mandatory fund contribution or a sickness day or wages in lieu 
of notice. The inference is strengthened by the fact that the registration 
of the plaintiff ’s business name was done by Lee for and on the plaintiff ’s 
behalf. By 14 June 2001, the parties had entered into a written agree-
ment (the Agreement). The plaintiff had signed the Agreement in the 
name of his business, Kwan Kee and the two employers signed in the 
name of D1. In May 2005, the defendants, using the name of D2, signed 
a new contract, effective from 1 June 2005, with the plaintiff again using 
the name of Kwan Kee (the second Agreement). The terms of the second 
Agreement were basically those of the fi rst Agreement. Refl ecting the 
two employers’ desire to make assurance doubly sure, each agreement 
expressly provided that the parties were not entering into an employer-
employee relationship and that the plaintiff did not have the rights and 
benefi ts of an employee.
57 Ibid.
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The plaintiff started work on 14 June 2001 and drove the employers’ 
lorry bearing registration number JE 2403 between Hong Kong and the 
Mainland until, on 24 October 2005, he was purportedly summarily dis-
missed by D2 for gross insubordination. The plaintiff sued as an employee 
who was unlawfully dismissed and claimed against the defendants, inter 
alia, unpaid wages, wages in lieu of notice, statutory holiday pay for nearly 
four years, annual leave payments and severance payment. The two 
employers fi led a joint defence and counterclaimed various sums from 
the plaintiff. (Details of the counter claim—which the court ultimately 
rejected—are not relevant.)
Deputy District Court WC Li heard the claim. The learned judge 
analysed factors drawn from the control, integration and entrepreneurial 
tests to decide whether the plaintiff was an employee or an independent 
contractor to hold:
“… All the factors in this case pointed to the direction that this was a 
contract of service and not a contract for service. This is so despite the 
express words in the agreements that the parties were not entering into an 
employer-employee relationship and the agreements expressly stated that 
the employee did not have the rights and benefi ts of an employee. These 
express stipulations in a contract of employment are void by law. Section 70 
of the Employment Ordinance protects an employee from any attempt by 
an employer who tries to avoid their statutory duties as an employer by con-
tracting out …. I found that the Plaintiff was the Defendants’ employee at 
all relevant time ... I would fi nd in the Plaintiff ’s favour that he was entitled 
to all rights and benefi ts under the Employment Ordinance, Cap 57. For this 
reason, the Plaintiff was entitled to have judgment to his claims for annual 
leave pay and statutory holiday pay that he had been deprived for the years 
that he had worked for the Defendants.” (para 15)
“The Defendants were under a misapprehension that if the Plaintiff had a 
business registration name, that would mean the Plaintiff was a business and 
he would not be an employee but an independent contractor. This would 
only be a futile attempt in furtherance of a scheme to deprive workers of their 
entitlement under the employment law.” (para 17)
“On the … question as to whether the Plaintiff was entitled to severance 
payment, the Defendants had the burden of proof to show on a balance of 
probabilities that the Plaintiff was dismissed for reasons other than redun-
dancy. The Defendants had not discharged this burden at all. By virtue of 
s 31Q of the Employment Ordinance, Cap 57, the Plaintiff was presumed 
to have been dismissed for reason of severance. By their Defence, the 
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Defendants only disputed whether the Plaintiff was an employee. In Para 9 
of their Defence, they stated that if the court found the Plaintiff to be their 
employee, they would ask for the amount of the counterclaim to be deducted 
from the sum/s awarded to the Plaintiff. On this basis, the Plaintiff ’s claim for 
severance payment would succeed.” (para 18)
On the facts, the court rejected the view that the plaintiff had been 
validly dismissed from employment.
The court in Lam Yau Kuen v Easy (Hang Fung) Transportation Co Ltd 
(Lam Yau Kuen) adopted a holistic view of the transaction that led to 
the agreement between the plaintiff and the two employers. It looked at 
the true nature of the transaction which it did not shirk from identifying 
as an employer-employee relationship rather than the legal effect of the 
sham business-to-business relationship that the two employers tried to 
create. In this, the District Court was undoubtedly aided by the fact that 
there was a contract spanning some years, the terms of which it could 
strike down as offending s 70 of the EO. 
Applying the ratio of Lui’s Case to Lam Yau Kuen produces a completely 
different result. The two employers in Lam Yau Kuen would be perfectly 
entitled to arrange their affairs so as to prevent their liability under the 
EO from arising. That is to say, the two employers would be entitled to tell 
the plaintiff that they would not deal with him unless he agreed to register 
a business and even then, they would only enter into a contract for service 
instead of contract of employment. In this situation, a clause declaim-
ing that the contract did not entitle the business to any of the benefi ts, 
privileges and protections conferred upon employees by the EO would 
not offend s 70 because it would be contained in a contract for service 
and not of service. The Court of Appeal decision would enable the two 
employers to neatly side-step the EO. In the circumstances that prompted 
the plaintiff in Lam Yau Kuen to sue, the two employers would be entitled 
to deny him wages in lieu of notice, the unpaid wages, statutory holiday 
payments, annual leave payments and, of course, severance payment; as 
an independent contractor, the plaintiff would be left with his remedy in 
damages for the contract sum due to him—provided he could prove his 
loss. The plaintiff could not, in that eventuality, claim statutory holiday 
payments, annual leave payments and, of course, severance payment. 
Employers could also avoid their full liability for sickness days. Under 
the EO, a “sickness day” means a day on which an employee is absent 
from his work by reason of his being unfi t therefore on account of injury or 
sickness.58 An employer has to pay an employee who has been employed 
58 EO, s 2.
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under a continuous contract for a month or more a “sickness allowance”59 
generally amounting to four-fi fths of his average wages60—if he takes four 
or more consecutive sickness days.61 A department in a Hong Kong uni-
versity used to employ lecturers under only successive 11-month contracts. 
The department did so because of the lecturers’ entitlement to sickness 
allowance accrues at the rate of two paid sickness days for each completed 
month under a continuous contract during the fi rst 12 months of such 
employment and at the rate of four paid sickness days for each such month 
thereafter.62 By successive 11-month contracts, the department ensured 
that the lecturers were only entitled to two sickness days per month for 
each contract. Since lecturers are usually healthy young individuals, one 
wonders whether such a university department would be trying to save the 
costs of a facility that lecturers hardly, if ever, use. 
One may speculate whether the university department’s decision to 
enter only into 11-month contracts could also be motivated by the desire 
to avoid the paid annual leave provisions in the EO. An employee who 
has been in employment under a continuous contract for not less than 12 
months shall, in respect of each calendar year of completed service with 
the same employer, be entitled to paid annual leave.63 The rate of annual 
leave is seven days for the second and third years of service, eight days in 
the fourth year, nine days in the fifth year, 10 days in the sixth year, 11 days 
in the seventh year, 12 days in the eighth year, 13 days in the ninth year 
and 14 days for each year from the tenth year following.64 By entering into 
successive 11-month contracts with the same individuals, the university 
department would reduce its expenditure by minimising the number of 
paid leave days it had to grant each lecturer. This is unlikely to be a uni-
versity policy and is more likely to be the action of the department head. 
In Hong Kong, an employer can dismiss an employee either with an 
agreed notice or with wages in lieu of notice. In both situations, the employer 
does not have to assign a reason for such dismissal. Such dismissals are unfair 
and “especially unfair to ageing employees dismissed through no fault of 
their own who have served the same employer for several decades”.65 What 
made the dismissal of elderly long serving employees particularly unfair 
was that the elderly found it more diffi cult to fi nd alternative employment. 
The long service payment scheme was introduced on “the premise that the 
59 EO, s 33(1). 
60 EO, s 35(2). The employer may pay more but not less than the prescribed rate.
61 EO, s 33(3).
62 EO, s 33(2). 
63 EO, s 41AA(1).
64 EO, Table to s 41AA(2)
65 The Secretary for Education and Manpower moving the second reading of the Employment 
(Amendment) Bill 1985: Hong Kong Hansard, 4 December 1985, p 294.
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dismissal of an elderly long service (sic) employee without some form of 
provision for his future … (was) itself unreasonable”. The quantum of the 
long service payment that the scheme mandated an employer to make to 
a dismissed employee was based on the employee’s age and length of ser-
vice.66 Shorn of details, an employee who has served the same employer 
under a continuous contract for not less than fi ve years and is dismissed 
without notice or payment in lieu of notice, ie for other than “cause”67 is 
entitled to a long service payment. An employee with fi ve years of continu-
ous service who terminates his contract under specifi ed circumstances will 
also be entitled to a long service payment.68 The formula for calculating 
the quantum of a long service payment is spelt out in s 31V of the EO. By 
s 31RB, each domestic servant is entitled to a long service payment upon 
completing fi ve years’ continuous service with the same employer. In Hong 
Kong, domestic servants are usually female. A foreign domestic servant is 
normally employed on an initial two-year contract. Her second contract is 
also for two years. Anecdotal evidence abounds of employers denying their 
domestic servant of a long service payment by simply letting her go after her 
second contract and hiring a different domestic helper. This practice would, 
under the decision in Lui’s Case, now be recognised as perfectly lawful.
Since the coming into force of the EO, employers have attempted to 
avoid their statutory obligations to their employees. As we have seen, 
the attempts have run the gamut—from having the employee renounce 
in writing his status and rights as an employee; to treating the individual 
working for them as an independent contractor rather than an employee 
entitled to the rights, benefi ts and protections conferred by the statute; 
to requiring that the employee register a business and contract as a busi-
ness organisation rather than as an individual; to employing the worker 
under successive term contracts where each contract was for a shorter term 
than that required to qualify for a statutory right or benefi t such as annual 
leave, medical leave, a severance payment and a long service payment, 
to mention a few. And as we have also seen, our courts have tried val-
iantly to prevent employers from thwarting the intention of the legislature. 
In attempting to give effect to the legislative intention, the courts have 
claimed that the statutory defi nition was different from that signifi ed by 
the plain meaning of the words in the statute, roped in the concept of a 
66 This paragraph has drawn liberally from Hong Kong Hansard, 4 December 1985, p 295.
67 Summary dismissal, ie without notice or without payment in lieu of notice, is a dismissal with 
cause. Summary dismissal is provided for under s 9 of the EO on the grounds of gross insubor-
dination, misconduct inconsistent with the due and faithful discharge of duties, fraud or dis-
honesty, habitual neglect of duties and any other ground on which the common law permitted 
summary dismissal.
68 EO, s 31R(1).
Binder for HKLJ.indb   890 12/17/2012   4:12:01 PM
Vol 42 Part 3 The Avoidance of Statutory Benefi ts to Employees 891
global contract, simply brushed aside declarations that the worker was not 
an employee but an independent contractor or treated as a sham, docu-
mentation showing that the contract was between two companies (ie that 
it was not a contract of employment). In so doing, the courts may have, as 
the Hon Cheung JA delicately put it, “stretched the limits of adjudication 
in order to overcome the problem(s)”69 created by the employers but it 
cannot be denied that the judges were trying to serve the needs of justice.
The Need for a Change in the EO
In holding that an employer is perfectly entitled to arrange his/its affairs 
to avoid his/its liability for the benefi ts, privileges and protections 
accorded to employees by the EO, the Court of Appeal may be seen to 
have granted employers the carte blanche to exploit their employees. This 
may be described as “an undesirable result” of the drafting of the statutory 
provisions involved. The undesirable result could have been side-stepped 
if the relevant provisions had been drafted with an eye on the undesir-
able results. But it may well be that this is a comment made with the 
wisdom that hindsight confers. Be that as it may, it has to be noted that 
the provisions of the EO70 as presently worded do not admit of any other 
interpretation under the existing canons of statutory construction. It is 
respectfully submitted that the Court of Appeal was, in the two cases, 
confronted by statutory provisions that were poorly drafted in failing to 
provide against the undesirable result. And, with respect, it is submitted 
that the Court of Appeal could not have come to any other decision 
without doing violence to the accepted norms of statutory construction. 
Would an appeal to the Court of Final Appeal have been salutary? When 
the Court of Appeal undertakes statutory interpretation, it is bound by 
the principles laid down by the Court of Final Appeal. An appeal to the 
Court of Final Appeal is thus highly unlikely to see the Court of Appeal 
decision herein being overturned. 
The foregoing should not leave the impression that the Court of 
Appeal is unaware of the fact that the consequences of its decisions are 
undesirable. In Wong Man Sum, the Hon Cheung JA observed:71
69 See n 35 above, para 8.
70 This is true, at the very least, of s 3 and Sch 1 (regarding a “continuous contract”), s 31B (in 
respect of severance payments) and s 31R (in respect of long service payments).
71 See n 35 above, paras 5 and 6. The Hon Yueng JA, at para 11, seems to have concurred with this 
observation.
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“5.  The Employment Ordinance is clearly in the nature of a social legisla-
tion. Its aim is to provide some minimum benefi ts to workers who, more 
often than not, do not have equal bargaining powers as their employers. 
This disparity is even more intense in Hong Kong when there is no 
system of collective bargaining between employers and workers’ unions.
6.  The situation is clearly unsatisfactory when employers are able to adopt 
devices which relieve them of their obligation towards their employ-
ees. The consequence is that a large sector of the labour force is being 
deprived of the entitlement intended by the legislature for their benefi t. 
This is not conducive towards social harmony.”
Evidently, the hands of the Court of Appeal are tied by the statutory 
provisions. 
The need for a change in the statutory regime which permits employ-
ers to relieve themselves of their statutory obligations to their employees 
was enunciated in Wong Man Sum by the Hon Cheung JA as follows:72
“9  I for one, would very much like to see changes being introduced along 
the lines ‘The Fixed-term Employees (Prevention of Less Favourable 
Treatment) Regulations 2002’ of the United Kingdom which imple-
mented the European Union Directive on Fixed Term Work (1999/70/
EC). The Regulations provide for, among other things, a maximum 
limit of four years for fi xed term contracts so as to prevent the abuse 
of the use of successive fi xed term contracts. Obviously any change in 
Hong Kong must cater for local conditions.”
The foregoing was endorsed by the Hon Yeung JA.73 Their Lordships made 
the above observation in the context of a case on severance payment, a 
pre-condition for which is 24 months’ service under a continuous contract 
of employment. Their Lordships’ proposed change is limited to just sever-
ance payment. And in relation to severance payment, it should work. This 
may be seen as a “surgical strike” meant to target the avoidance of sever-
ance payment. It does not address the possible avoidance by employers of a 
whole host of other statutory benefi ts, privileges and protections conferred 
upon employees. To prevent avoidance from continuing or becoming even 
more pervasive than it already is, it is respectfully submitted that what is 
required is a statutory provision prohibiting employers from avoiding their 
statutory obligations to their employees. Such a prohibition would render 
72 See n 35 above, para 9.
73 See n 35 above, para 11.
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any measure meant to “avoid” an employer’s obligation to an employee 
void. 
The advantage of statutory intervention is that the courts would not 
have to “stretch the limits of adjudication in order to overcome” the 
arrangements that employers and their legal advisers may devise to avoid 
their statutory obligations to their employers. To this end we propose 
that the EO be amended.
The Proposed Amendment
The fi rst question that arises is where, in the EO, should such an amend-
ment be located? Section 70 now voids any contract term that purports 
to extinguish or reduce any right, benefi t or protection conferred upon 
any employee by EO. It would be logical for the anti-avoidance provi-
sion to be inserted immediately after the existing s 70. Since a section 
71 already exists, we would have the proposed provision numbered “s 
70A” and be headed, “Avoidance and Evasion of any right, benefi t or 
protection”. Our proposed provision will hereafter be referred as “s 70A”.
We envisage s 70A as having six subsections. We have seen that avoid-
ance is independent of the contract of employment because any contract 
term purporting to extinguish or reduce any right, benefi t or protection 
conferred upon an employee by the EO is void under s 70. Avoidance 
usually takes the form of something other than a contract or a contract 
term. It is an agreement (short of a contract) or an arrangement or a 
plan or an understanding that (the employer reaches with an employee) 
that is designed to and does deny, in full or in part, some right, benefi t 
or protection conferred upon an employee by the EO. Section 70A(1) 
will thus be a defi nition section setting a description of the devices that 
an employer may design to avoid his liability under the EO. Although 
a contract or a contract term would be within the remit of s 70, we act 
ex cautella abudanti to incorporate a contract and a contract term in our 
defi nition. Thus, our s 70A(1) will read:
“(1)  For the purposes of this section ‘arrangement’ means any contract, 
contract term, agreement, plan, transaction, operation, scheme or 
understanding (whether enforceable or unenforceable) including all 
steps by which it is carried into effect.” 
The device that brings about avoidance is, as we have seen, usually acti-
vated, inter alia, before the contract of employment commences. For exam-
ple, in the case of a benefi t requiring a qualifying period of 24 months’ 
continuous employment, the employer might limit the contract term to 
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only 18 months. Or, it may occur during the currency of an employ-
ment contract as when an employee is denied his right to annual leave. 
Interestingly, in a Hong Kong university, a lecturer was granted maternity 
leave as well as maternity leave pay for the prescribed period. However, 
on reporting for work after her maternity leave, the employee was told 
that her workload for the rest of the teaching year would be doubled to 
ensure that she taught as much as she would have if she had not been 
granted maternity benefi ts. That is to say, the employee had to “pay back” 
her maternity leave.74 In Leung Ka Lau v Hospital Authority,75 the Court 
of Final Appeal held that a “holiday” meant a day on which an employee 
was entitled to abstain from working for his employer. For an employer 
to grant an employee a week’s holiday and the following week require the 
employee to complete his normal work as well as the work he would have 
done if he had not been granted the leave cannot be right as it reduces 
to a sham, the “holiday” purportedly granted to the employee. Although 
the EO is silent on whether leave is the same as a holiday, it is respect-
fully submitted that it is. For an employer to require an employee return-
ing from maternity leave to double up and complete the work she would 
have done during her maternity leave demonstrates two dimensions of 
avoidance.76 The fi rst is avoidance during the course of a contract and 
the second is indirect avoidance. 
The words with which the proposed s 70A(2) concludes, ie “regard-
less of whether or not the employee assented to the same”, are meant 
to preclude the defence that “the employee agreed to this” or that “the 
employee acquiesced to this by not expressing any objection to it”. Our 
proposed s 70A(2) would read:
74 An employee reporting for work after her maternity leave and being required, in addition to 
her normal work, to perform the work she would have done during the period of her maternity 
leave would have a cause of action under the Sex Discrimination Ordinance (Cap 480). Relief 
under the latter may, in addition to compensatory damages, include aggravated and exemplary 
damages as well as damages for injury to feelings. But not all avoidance devices come within the 
purview of other statutes or statutes that provide relief. 
75 (2009) 12 HKCFAR 924 at 952, para 95, per Ribeiro PJ. “While it is true that there is no defi ni-
tion of ‘holiday’ along the lines of the ‘rest day’ defi nition, it is my view that the word ‘holiday’ 
in the present context should be construed as bearing the same meaning, that is, as a day on 
which an employee is entitled to abstain from working for his employer and is free to spend as 
he sees fi t. That, in my opinion, is the natural and ordinary meaning of the word ‘holiday’.”
76 The Labour Department when contacted by phone on this matter refused to consider this as 
avoidance or evasion; instead, it held that this was a case of a “unilateral variation” of a term of 
contract. The latter position would be scant comfort to an employee especially where contract 
are widely drafted to require the employee to “perform such duties as may be assigned to you by 
your Head of Department or his designate”. 
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“(2)   Any arrangement designed or implemented by an employer, whether 
before or during the term of a particular contract of employment, to 
directly or indirectly avoid or mitigate his liability for any right, ben-
efi t or privilege conferred upon the employee by this Ordinance shall 
be void regardless of whether or not it is assented to by the employee.”
Tax law alerts us that one of the defences that tax evaders or avoiders 
use is to deny the intention to evade or cheat—as the case may be. The 
defence is that even if the scheme has the effect that led to their being 
hauled into court, that was not its intention or not its dominant or pri-
mary intention. This is clearly unacceptable. For that reason, we provide 
that so long as avoidance or evasion is one of the purposes or effects of 
an arrangement, avoidance shall be made out. Thus, our s 70A(3) shall 
read:
“(3)  Where an arrangement made or entered into, whether before or after 
the coming into force of this section, has two or more purposes or 
effects, and one of its purposes or effects (not being a merely inci-
dental purpose or effect) is avoidance or mitigation of any right, ben-
efi t or privilege conferred upon the employee by this Ordinance, the 
arrangement shall be void.”
The proposed s 70A(3) is meant to catch any avoidance device to which 
the employer may resort whether before or during the currency of a con-
tract of employment.
An employee who is the victim of avoidance (necessarily by his 
employer) and who is forced to resort to legal proceedings for relief 
suffers more than loss of just the value of the right, benefi t or protec-
tion; he also incurs emotional distress and the stress fl owing from the 
uncertainty of outcome inherent in all legal proceedings. In addition, 
there are legal costs. Although legal representation is not permitted 
in the Labour Tribunal, it is the rare employee who can mount legal 
proceedings without fi rst obtaining legal advice—which is not free. 
The employee who establishes his claim must necessarily be compen-
sated in the value of the right, benefi t or protection avoided (whether 
fi xed by the EO or where the EO is silent on this matter, by the court). 
However, we believe that to be adequately compensated and to deter 
other employers from resorting to avoidance, the employee should be 
paid double the value of the sum avoided or where the value is not 
prescribed by the EO, such amount as will compensate the employee 
and simultaneously serve as a deterrent to other employers. Thus, the 
proposed s 70A(4) will read:
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“(4)  An employer who is held to have attempted to execute or imple-
mented an arrangement to avoid or mitigate his liability for any right, 
benefi t or privilege conferred upon the employee by this Ordinance 
shall pay twice the value of the right, benefi t or protection prescribed 
by the Ordinance, or where the Ordinance is silent on this matter, 
such amount as will compensate the employee and simultaneously 
serve as a deterrent to other employers.” 
The remedy we propose may be viewed as a form of exemplary dam-
ages. Although anathema to Hong Kong contract law,77 we note that 
in Hong Kong employers are among those already liable to pay employ-
ees punitive or exemplary damages for discrimination under the Sex 
Discrimination Ordinance (Cap 480),78 Disability Discrimination 
Ordinance (Cap 487),79 Family Status Discrimination Ordinance 
(Cap 527)80 and Race Discrimination Ordinance (Cap 602)81 which 
create statutory torts. Be that as it may, we draw our inspiration from 
the Inland Revenue Ordinance (Cap 112) which seems to have 
inspired employers to adopt avoidance devices. Section 82A speci-
fi es circumstances that make a taxpayer liable “to additional tax of 
an amount not exceeding treble the amount of tax which has been 
undercharged in consequence of specifi ed conduct of the taxpayer”.82 
An employer found to have adopted an avoidance device can hardly 
complain that this amounts to a penalty. In any event, if the proposed 
s 70A(4) amounts to exemplary damages, there is no impediment to 
the Legislature providing for exemplary damages where it deems the 
same to be appropriate relief. 
At common law, the breach of a contract of employment does not 
create criminal liability. The common law has, however, been abrogated, 
in part, by the EO making certain breaches of the type it spells out attract 
criminal liability. The best known examples are perhaps those relating 
to the payment of wages (see ss 63C, 63CA and 63D). But even where 
criminal sanctions are provided, they do not benefi t the employee. It is 
therefore necessary to provide compensation to the employee denied the 
77 We are aware that except for Canada and the United States, other common law jurisdictions 
(including Hong Kong) do not countenance exemplary damages in contract and restrict the 
same to tort. See Abdul Majid and Krishnan Arjunan, “Exemplary Damages for Tort and Breach 





82 Section 82A applies only where a decision is made not to prosecute the taxpayer.
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rights, privileges and protections conferred upon him by the EO by his 
employer’s breaching or evading the same. This goal may be achieved by 
a suitably worded provision in s 70A. To this end, we propose that the 
remedies provided by s 70A be extended to encompass evasion. Thus we 
propose that s 70A(5) shall read: 
“(5)  This section shall apply to any arrangement designed or implemented 
to evade, as it does to any arrangement meant to avoid, any liability 
for any right, benefi t or protection conferred upon the employee by 
this Ordinance.” 
Both the Minor Employment Claims Adjudication Board83 and the 
Labour Tribunal84 have jurisdiction over claims arising out of a contract 
of employment. Both the Board and Labour Tribunal are specifi cally 
granted the jurisdiction to decide the right of an employee to a sever-
ance payment and the quantum thereof.85 Section 5(3)(a) of the Minor 
Employment Adjudication Claims Board Ordinance (Cap 453) and para 
1(3) of the Schedule to the Labour Tribunal Ordinance (Cap 25) are 
similarly worded to deny the Board and the Tribunal the jurisdiction to 
enquire into, hear or determine any “claim for a sum of money, or other-
wise in respect of a cause of action, founded in tort whether arising from 
a breach of contract or a breach of duty imposed by a rule of common law 
or by any enactment”. To prevent enterprising counsel from even raising 
this section to defeat the relief incorporated in the proposed s 70A, our 
proposed s 70A(6) would read:
“(6)  By virtue of this subsection and notwithstanding s 5(3)(a) of the 
Minor Employment Adjudication Claims Board Ordinance (Cap 453) 
or paragraph 1(3) of the Schedule to the Labour Tribunal Ordinance 
(Cap 25) or any other law, the Minor Employment Adjudication 
Claims Board and the Labour Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to hear 
and determine any proceedings under this section and shall have all 
such powers as are necessary or expedient for it to have in order to 
provide or grant any remedy enacted in this section.” 
83 Minor Employment Claims Adjudication Board, s 5(1) read together with para (b) of the 
Schedule thereto.
84 Labour Tribunal Ordinance, s 7(1) and the Schedule to the Ordinance.
85 Schedule to the Labour Tribunal Ordinance, para 4; and the Schedule to the Minor Employment 
Claims Adjudication Board Ordinance, para (b)(iv).
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It is conceded that the proposed s 70A(6) is in the nature of a proactive 
strike. The whole of the proposed s 70A is at Appendix A.
Conclusion
We began this article by quoting a remark by Martin Luther King Jnr that 
eloquently describes the need for legislation to constrain “the heartless”. 
While the intention of the Hong Kong legislators to protect employ-
ees against heartless employers is clear, a challenge to the legislation in 
the courts was upheld revealing that even well-intentioned laws may be 
inadequately drafted to discharge their function of providing just protec-
tion to the employees. Notwithstanding the intention of legislators to 
afford protection to employees, the presiding judge was constrained by 
legally accepted principles to rule in favour of the employers. We recom-
mend that the legislation in question be amended to incorporate anti-
avoidance provisions which will not frustrate the legislative intention to 
protect employees. 
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Appendix
The Proposed Amendment
Section 70A  Avoidance and Evasion of any Right, Benefi t 
or Protection
1 For the purposes of this section, “arrangement” means any con-
tract, contract term, agreement, plan, transaction, operation, 
scheme or understanding (whether enforceable or unenforceable) 
including all steps by which it is carried into effect . 
2 Any arrangement designed or implemented by an employer, 
whether before or during the term of a particular contract of 
employment, to directly or indirectly avoid or mitigate his liabil-
ity for any right, benefi t or privilege conferred upon the employee 
by this Ordinance shall be void regardless of whether or not it is 
assented to by the employee.
3 Where an arrangement made or entered into, whether before or 
after the coming into force of this section, has two or more pur-
poses or effects, and one of its purposes or effects (not being a 
merely incidental purpose or effect) is avoidance or mitigation of 
any right, benefi t or privilege conferred upon the employee by this 
Ordinance, the arrangement shall be void.
4 An employer who is held to have attempted to execute or imple-
mented an arrangement to avoid or mitigate his liability for any 
right, benefi t or privilege conferred upon the employee by this 
Ordinance shall pay twice the value of the right, benefi t or protec-
tion prescribed by the Ordinance, or where the Ordinance is silent 
on this matter, such amount as will compensate the employee and 
simultaneously serve as a deterrent to other employers. 
5 This section shall apply to any arrangement designed or imple-
mented to evade, as it does to any arrangement meant to avoid, 
any liability for any right, benefi t or privilege conferred upon the 
employee by this Ordinance. 
6 By virtue of this subsection and notwithstanding s 5(3)(a) of 
the Minor Employment Adjudication Claims Board Ordinance 
(Cap 453) or para 1(3) of the Schedule to the Labour Tribunal Ordi-
nance (Cap 25) or any other law, the Minor Employment Adjudica-
tion Claims Board and the Labour Tribunal shall have jurisdiction 
to hear and determine any proceedings under this section and shall 
have all such powers as are necessary or expedient for it to have in 
order to provide or grant any remedy enacted in this section. 
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